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ABSTRACT 
Research on Bulgarian migration has been rather sketchy often 
based on small purposive samples in selected host countries or on 
macro data of unreliable quality from Bulgaria itself. A thorough 
understanding of the impacts of migration for Bulgaria is needed to 
heighten the possibility for policy makers in both sending and 
receiving countries to help optimise the benefits of migration. This 
paper aims to enhance this understanding by offering an historical 
overview of migration dynamics and showing that in recent years 
there has been a growing trend towards temporary and seasonal 
migration rather than permanent settlement, the preferred 
destinations being Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Germany and 
Netherlands. Seasonal and circular migration is becoming more 
ethnically and regionally specific. The paper shows that current 
emigration trends have substantial economic and demographic 
consequences, both positively (the contribution to loosening of labour 
market pressures, poverty alleviation, and an increase of small 
businesses through remittances) and negatively (the danger of brain 
drain and depopulation of peripheral regions of the country). 
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Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: lessons from 
Bulgaria 
 
1. Introduction 
Research on Bulgarian migration has been rather sketchy, often being based on 
either small purposive samples in selected host countries or on macro data of 
unreliable quality from Bulgaria itself. More recently, some analyses have 
focused on certain socio-economic impacts of the emigration phenomenon on 
Bulgaria. These analyses mainly refer to the effects of remittances and of a 
‘brain drain’ on labour supply, and on family structures, particularly on the 
children of migrant parents. 
A better and more thorough understanding of the positive and negative 
consequences of migration for Bulgaria is needed as this will heighten the 
possibility for policy-making, both in receiving and origin countries, to help 
optimise the benefits of migration. This paper aims to enhance this 
understanding by identifying the size and nature as well as the dynamics of 
emigration, providing empirical evidence on the economic and social costs and 
benefits of emigration for Bulgaria and discussing the most recent government 
measures to maximise the benefits of migration. The paper concludes by 
summarising the major challenges for policy makers in Bulgaria.   
The discussion is supported by data from the 2001 Population Census in 
Bulgaria, the Bulgarian National Bank, the National Statistical Institute, the 
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Institute for Market Economics, the OECD and the Council of Europe, the 
Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, in-depth interviews with local authority 
officials and returned seasonal migrants (Guentcheva et al. 2003) and 
quantitative evidence from household survey data (Mintchev & Boshnakov, 
2005), together with  micro-survey data collected by the author (Markova 
2001; Markova & Sarris 2002; Markova 2006; Markova & Reilly 2007). The 
last section of the paper draws on policy documents produced by the Bulgarian 
government. 
 
2. The dynamics of migration from Bulgaria: an overview 
2.1. The period: September 1944 – November 1989 
The end of WWII marked a fundamental change in the migratory processes and 
policies in Bulgaria and a new era for Bulgarian ethnic minorities as well. A 
ban on the free movement of Bulgarian citizens was introduced through 
sophisticated border policing systems and very restrictive and highly 
complicated system for issuing passports. Bulgarian emigration in this period 
was predominantly motivated by political reasons or was related to ethnicity. 
Labour emigration was entirely controlled by the state. Labour supply was 
regulated by bilateral agreements either with other countries from the Warsaw 
Pact or with countries in the Arab world, such as Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq 
and others that followed policies that were sympathetic with the communist 
principles. 
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2.2. Ethnic emigration 
The first wave of post-WWII ethnic emigration occurred in the period 1946-
1951 when predominantly Bulgarian Turks, Jews, Armenians and Russians left 
Bulgaria. The emigration of Bulgarian Turks remained the most significant 
phenomenon in the history of this period.  Facilitated by a bilateral agreement 
signed with Turkey, some 154,000 Bulgarian Turks migrated to Turkey in the 
period 1950-1951. They settled primarily in the Marmara and the Aegean Sea 
regions. The collectivisation of land in Bulgaria was also considered a strong 
“push” factor for the first mass outflow of ethnic Turks since the majority of 
them were farmers and the expropriation of the land in 1949 was felt as a 
severe shock. In the following years, several agreements were signed with 
Turkey to reunite divided Turkish families, and another 130,000 people left for 
Turkey between 1968 and 1978 (Zhelyaskova 1998; Petkova 2002). After the 
Turks, Jews were the second largest group involved in the post-WWII ethnic 
emigration flows from Bulgaria1. Between 1948 and 1949, some 32,106 Jews 
emigrated from Bulgaria to Israel. Earlier, another 4,000 Jews, mainly youth 
and children, had migrated to Israel to join the Zionist struggle (Guentcheva et 
al. 2003: 12). In the period 1946-1951, there was a mass emigration of 
Armenians as well. Actively facilitated by the Soviet government, about 8,000 
left, mainly to Armenia (Mintchev 1999). Several dozen Russian families from 
north-eastern Bulgaria also left for the Soviet Union. Around 2,000 Slovaks 
                                                 
1
 With the help of prominent Bulgarians, MPs and the Bulgarian King himself, some 50,000 Jews were 
saved from the Nazi concentration camps during the WWII (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 12). 
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and Czechs returned to their home country from Bulgaria between 1949 and 
1951 (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 12-13).  
The second wave of mass ethnic emigration occurred during the period 1966-
1980, when the total net emigration from Bulgaria reached 115,309 people. 
Almost all of these emigrants were ethnic Turks who moved to Turkey in 
accordance with bilateral agreements (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 11). This 
emigration was particularly intense between 1976 and 1979, with a highpoint in 
1978 when net emigration from Bulgaria reached 33,000 (Gächter 2002). 
In the spring of 1989, a few months before the fall of the Communist 
government, there was a large exodus of Bulgarian Turks, leaving for Turkey. 
This was the infamous mass exodus, ironically called ‘the big excursion’, 
which, most political scientists in Bulgaria believed, had a great impact upon 
the shattering of the Communist regime (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 14). It marked 
a dramatic culmination of years of tensions and resilience among the Turkish 
community, which intensified with the Bulgarian government’s assimilation 
campaign in the winter of 1985, which attempted to make ethnic Turks change 
their names to Bulgarian Slavic names. The campaign began with a ban on 
wearing traditional Turkish dress and speaking Turkish in public places 
followed by the forced name-changing campaign. This ‘Bulgarization’ policy 
provoked resistance among the Turkish minority, expressed in the form of 
protests and demonstrations, many of which were violently suppressed by 
troops. Some Turks went on hunger strike.  In May 1989, the Bulgarian 
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authorities began to expel Turks (Poulton 1993). When the Turkish 
government’s efforts to negotiate with Bulgaria for an orderly migration failed, 
Turkey opened its borders to Bulgaria on 2 June 1989. A mass influx followed. 
Some claimed that Turkey was given more than US$ 250 million in grants and 
loans by the United States government and the Council of Europe in order to 
open its borders to Bulgarian Turks (Bobeva 1994: 225). However, the Turkish 
government decided on 21 August 1989 to reintroduce immigration visa 
requirements for ethnic Turks, which had been temporarily lifted in June 
(Kirisci 1996). It was estimated that about 360,000 ethnic Turks had by then 
left for Turkey (Zhelyazkova 1998).  More than a third would subsequently 
return to Bulgaria once the ban on Turkish names had been revoked in 
December 1989 (Guentcheva et al. 2003: 14). 
2.3. Political emigration 
The establishment of the communist regime determined a wave of political 
emigration from Bulgaria, especially since 1948 when the leftist opposition 
parties were dissolved.  The largest communities of political emigrants were 
concentrated in the neighbouring countries of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, 
and in Western Europe, namely Italy and France. Bulgarian political emigration 
was ideologically and politically divided. It was even more divided in 1950 
when the Communist government decreed an amnesty that allowed a one-year 
grace for all political refugees to return to Bulgaria, the only exception being 
those found guilty of political espionage. As a result, Bulgarian political 
emigration never managed to consolidate itself and to become a powerful 
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opposition to the communist government (see Guentcheva et al. 2003).  The 
number of Bulgarian political asylum-seekers grew in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, and then decreased in the late 1950s, when only 1,063 managed to 
emigrate. The numbers decreased further in the 1980s to just 684 registered 
emigrants between 1981 and 1988 (Table 1). However, the accuracy of the 
official emigration data contained in the Statistical Yearbooks of Bulgaria, 
from 1952-1989, is highly debatable as it would not have captured those who 
had used ‘illegal’ ways to leave the country and requested asylum abroad. For 
example, the official statistics in Bulgaria point to 684 emigrants who left the 
country in 1981-1988. For the same period, the statistics of the host countries 
have registered 2,761 asylum applications lodged by Bulgarian citizens: 893 in 
Germany, 851 in Austria, 384 in Italy, 166 in Switzerland, 119 in Greece, 105 
in Turkey, 67 in Belgium, 55 in Sweden, 44 in Spain, 24 in the Netherlands, 20 
in the UK, 19 in Denmark, 13 in Norway, 3 in Portugal and 1 in Finland 
(calculations based on data in UNHCR 2001). 
Table 1 Total number of emigrants from Bulgaria, 1946-1988. 
Year Emigrants 
1946-1950 100,121 
1951-1955 101,454 
1956-1960 1,063 
1961-1965 429 
1966-1970 14,280 
1971-1975 27,139 
1976-1980 73,890 
1981-1988 684 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Bulgaria, 1952-1989. 
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2.4. The period after 10 November 1989 
On 10 November 1989 the Bulgarian communist regime fell after 45 years of 
uninterrupted rule and Bulgarian citizen were allowed freedom of travel again. 
According to the National Statistical Institute (1992) some 218,000 Bulgarians 
left the country in this particular year and emigration flows were mainly 
directed towards Turkey (Table 2). This emigration wave is estimated to have 
been the highest since 1989.    
Table 2 Bulgarian emigration 1989-2009. 
Year Men Women TOTAL 
1989 106,432 (48.8%) 111,568 (51.2%) 218,000 (100%) 
1990 68,759 (78.2%) 19,136 (21.8%)  87,895 (100%)  
1991 19,112 (47.5%) 21,152 (52.5%) 40,264 (100%) 
1992 65,250 
1993 69,609 
1994 64,000 
1995 54,000 
1996 
Figures for these years are not broken 
down by gender 
66,000 
…                                 
2007* 1,119 (37.8%)             1,839 (62.2%) 2,958 (100%) 
2008*    766 (36.3%)             1,346 (63.7%)                         2,112 (100%) 
2009* 8,353 (43.9%)            10,686 (56.1%)   19,039 (100%) 
Source: National Statistical Institute. Note: * The figures include only those people who’ve 
declared change of address (from Bulgaria to a foreign country) to the administrative 
authorities in Bulgaria 
The second emigration wave was prompted by continuously deteriorating 
economic conditions and widespread disillusionment, especially amongst 
young people, with the first democratic elections in 1990 won by the renamed 
communist party. Almost 88,000 people left in 1990. Once again, most of them 
were Bulgarian Turks. At the end of 1990 the total official number of 
unemployed reached 70,000. Although this was a small proportion of a 
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workforce of almost 4 million, it had a significant psychological impact. Many 
people were leaving the country because of fears of growing unemployment 
(Hutchings 1994). Highly skilled migrants were leaving for more permanent 
settlement in Austria and Germany in Europe and in the transatlantic countries 
of US and Canada. The main driving force for emigration was the desire to 
work in their chosen professions while there was a growing threat of 
unemployment due to the closure of many Bulgarian research institutes and the 
redundancy of management posts in the public sector (SOPEMI 1993). 
Neighbouring countries of Turkey and Greece were absorbing predominantly 
migrants from the lower skill end of the labour market and the main ‘pull’ 
factor was survival.   In 1993 Bulgaria was placed on the EU’s ‘black’ visa list. 
Restrictive visa regimes by EU countries changed significantly the direction 
and character of the migration flows. Official emigration to Western Europe - 
excepting Austria, a traditional economic and commercial partner, and 
Germany - dropped dramatically. Emigration to Greece and Italy was largely 
undocumented in character. Higher living standards and the desire for 
prosperity were the most important ‘pull’ factors for emigration.  By 1996 
Bulgaria was facing its most severe political and economic crisis, with an 
officially recorded inflation rate at 310.8% for 1996. Survival, once again, was 
the most powerful reason for leaving the country.  In 1997 and 1998 emigration 
was facilitated by the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), which 
favoured migration between the countries in transition. Emigration was 
directed mainly towards the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania (SOPEMI 
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1999).   Spain in particular became an attractive destination for Bulgarian 
migrants in the second half of the 1990s. Anecdotal evidence attributed this 
migration mainly to the comparative tolerance of the Spanish authorities, 
employers and local people towards undocumented foreign workers. 
Researchers at the Gabinet d’Estudis Socials (GES) in Barcelona estimated the 
total number of registered Bulgarians in Spain on 1 January 2007 to be 118,182 
(GES 2008).  In the second half of the 1990s, the number of Bulgarians 
choosing the UK as a destination became more significant, when Bulgarians 
started making use of the ECAA visas that allowed them entry into the UK as 
self-employed businessmen and women.  
Since 2001, Bulgaria has experienced appreciable though declining rates of 
emigration.  According to OECD data for the period 2001-2004, an estimated 
60,000 to 100,000 people left the country, which represented a considerable fall 
compared to an estimated 210,000 people who emigrated during the period 
1998-2001, with about 88,000 Bulgarian immigrants registered in the European 
countries in 20042. Bulgaria ranked fourth amongst the top 10 countries of 
origin for migrants in the EU, after Romania, Poland and Morocco (SOPEMI 
2006). This was a period of intensive reconstruction and implementation of 
sound macroeconomic policies in an attempt to fulfil the EU accession criteria. 
As a result, the average growth exceeded 6 percent per year in 2004-07. The 
country successfully completed EU negotiations in June 2004 and then, in 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted, however, that this figure includes new residence permits as well as renewed ones 
for people who had left the country in previous years and had returned.  
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April 2005, the accession treaty was signed in Luxemburg. On 1 January 2007 
Bulgaria joined the European Union. Per capita income increased by an 
average of 6 percent per year since 1998 (at purchasing power parity in real 
terms). Unemployment was reduced substantially from close to 20 percent in 
2000 to below 7 percent in 2007. In the first half of 2007, the tendency for a 
real growth of GDP above 6% continued signifying a stable pattern of 
economic development in the country3. However, despite an overall positive 
performance Bulgaria continued to be one of the poorest countries in the EU. 
The country’s per capita income in 2006 at purchasing power parity was just 37 
% of the average level of EU274. The large income differences reflected 
significant gaps in investment and productivity and in the functioning of 
product and factor markets, and still propel emigration. EU audit of the 
management of EU funds in the country published in July 2008 revealed that 
Bulgaria was not able to fully benefit of the EU assistance because of critical 
weaknesses in administrative and judicial capacity at all levels. High level 
corruption and organised crime exacerbated these problems5. Later on, the 
global economic and financial crisis caused deterioration in the country’s 
economic conditions with GDP declining by 3.5% and the unemployment rate 
reached 8% at the end of 2009. ‘Push’ factors once again reminiscent those of 
the 1990s while ‘Pull’ factors for emigration have changed as the host countries 
are plunged in recession. Notwithstanding, some Bulgarians continue to leave 
because of low living standards, for better professional realisation and for 
                                                 
3
 http://www.ime.bg.  
4
 http://www.worldbank.org  
5
 http://www.europe.bg/en/htmls/page.php?category=230&id=15949  
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access to education, while others return. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
significant number of Bulgarian migrants from Spain are returning in response 
to worsened economic conditions there. 
Mainly young people accepted at universities and seasonal workers are 
emigrating. The growing tendency towards temporary and seasonal migration 
rather than permanent settlement further expanded with Bulgaria’s EU 
membership. Most member states have imposed labour market restrictions for 
Bulgarian citizens except for self-employment; however, Bulgarian workers are 
exercising their right for free movement in the EU zone; while doing so they 
often undertake semi-legal jobs for a few months; they are a particular mobile 
category of temporary semi-legal workers. The rise in temporary or circular 
(repeated) economic migration, predominantly undocumented or semi-
documented (legal right for residence but not for work) in character, is 
attributed to increased unemployment in certain regions within Bulgaria. 
Pockets of extreme poverty persist in the country, especially in ethnically 
mixed rural areas. Thus, seasonal and circular migration becomes more 
ethnically and regionally specific. In some municipalities in Bulgaria, the 
emigrants are entirely of Turkish origin while, in others, there are ethnic 
Bulgarians. In some other municipalities, Roma people are predominant. For 
example, of all undocumented Bulgarian migrants in the Netherlands, 80% 
were said to be ethnic Turks, most of them coming from the south-eastern 
Bulgarian district of Kurdzhali (Guentcheva et al. 2003). Last but not least, the 
US, via its Green Card lottery system, remains an important destination for 
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permanent settlement, attracting annually between 5,000 and 6,000 Bulgarian 
immigrants (SOPEMI 2005). 
 
3. Review of the empirical evidence on the effects of migration on 
Bulgaria 
Migration impacts on a home country in a variety of ways depending upon the 
magnitudes, composition and nature of migration flows, as well upon the 
specific context from which migrants are drawn. This paper will consider four 
key aspects of migration: demographic and social impacts; labour market 
impacts; brain drain, brain gain and Diaspora and, the effects of remittances. 
What does the evidence on Bulgarian migration indicate with respect to each of 
these? 
3.1. Demographic and social impacts of migration 
One of the most immediate effects of Bulgarian emigration was the drastic 
reduction in the population. In the years between the last two Censuses of 1992 
and 2001, the Bulgarian population fell by 6% and over one-third of the 
reduction was attributed to emigration – some 217,809 people left the country 
during this period (National Statistical Institute 2004: 43). This figure is 
inconsistent with previous official statistics for the same period. For instance, 
for the period 1993-1996, National Statistical Institute estimated that the 
number of emigrants was 253,609 people (Table 2). For 1998-2001, official 
estimates put the emigrant number at 210,000 people (SOPEMI 2006). Results 
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from Bulgaria’s 2001 Census put the country’s population at 7.9 million, a 
decrease of about half a million from the previous census in 1992. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit in London gave even lower population figures, 
estimating Bulgaria’s population in 2001 at 7.7 million and forecasting a 
further fall to a total of 7.4 million by the year 20126.  
At the end of 2004 the permanent population of Bulgaria was 7,761,049, a 
decrease of 40,224 people compared to the population figures of 2003 
(National Statistical Institute 2005: 14). The negative development in the last 
few years is attributed to both a negative natural population growth (a low 
fertility level and an extremely high mortality-rate) and emigration. Bulgaria is 
amongst the five ‘oldest’ countries in Europe together with Italy, Greece, 
Germany and Spain, with a share of the older-age group (65 years and over) at 
more than 16% of the total population (Council of Europe 2004). At the end of 
2004, the share of young people under fifteen years of age was 1,073,000 
(13.8%). For the period 1998-2004, this share decreased by 268,000 and the 
share of people above 65 years of age increased by 26,000, and by the end of 
2004 reached 1,331,000 people (17.1%). In 2004, the working age population 
was 4,782,000 people (61.6%); as a result of mainly legislative changes, this 
category of people has increased by 35,000 people (0.7%) compared to 2003. 
Nevertheless the country’s old-age dependency ratio (the number of people 
below 15 and over 64 per 100 of the population between 15 and 64) dropped to 
                                                 
6
 http://sofiaecho.com/2007/07/26/654886_eiu-economic-indicators-in-bulgaria-to-weaken-through-
2011. 
  14 
44.9% in 2004, a reduction of 4% compared to 1998 (National Statistical 
Institute 2005: 16). 
Massive emigration, especially from the ethnically mixed regions in southeast 
Bulgaria resulted in the depopulation of some areas7. According to the 1992 
Census, some 344,849 Bulgarians of Turkish origin had migrated to Turkey 
between 1989 and 1992, which resulted in significant demographic decline in 
southern Bulgaria and the complete depopulation of some municipalities 
(SOPEMI 1995). Research on the home impacts of seasonal migration from 
Bulgaria (Guentcheva et al. 2003) pointed to some serious political 
consequences of the phenomenon. For example, as a result of the decline in the 
population in the ethnically mixed Kurdzhali region, two parliamentary seats 
were lost, which diminished the region’s overall political power. Bulgaria is 
already experiencing labour shortages both of high- and low-skilled labour. 
Recently, the government announced the transformation of the country from a 
migrant sending and a transit country into a migrant receiving one (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy 2008). 
Forecasts by the National Statistical Institute (NSI) of Bulgaria indicate that in 
the next 50 years the population of Bulgaria will shrink to 5.1 million, 
regardless of the increasing birth rates. The annual drop will be by 40,000 
people if the current socio-economic development persists and the policies 
                                                 
7
 At the end of 2004, 144 formerly populated areas in the country became entirely depopulated 
(population=0). These areas are mainly border regions in the south and west of the country (Capital 
2006). “Peasants of urban Type: Government policy is needed to put an end to the depopulation of 
villages”, issue 28) (in Bulgarian). This is due to increased urbanisation and external migration. 
According to NSI data, 67.1% of the population in 1990 lived in urban areas while in 2004 this figure 
had risen to 70%. 
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remain unchanged. The Director of the NSI’s Population Department has 
commented in the press that emigration was the main reason for the dramatic 
population decrease. His calculations pointed to about 20,000 Bulgarians 
leaving the country each year. However, the Minister of Labour and Social 
Policy presented a more optimistic picture of the Bulgarians’ intensions for 
emigration; in 2007, the share of Bulgarians who were planning to work abroad 
decreased by 80% compared to 2001. Employment agencies in the country 
claim that in recent times they have been receiving requests by mainly qualified 
Bulgarians living abroad who are interested in finding a job and returning more 
permanently in the country.  
There is little empirical evidence - with the exception of a few studies- on the 
social effects of emigration in Bulgaria. Most of the available information is 
anecdotal and discussed in the press. The main social effects of emigration in 
Bulgaria consist of changes in family composition and child outcomes in terms 
of health and education.  
Changes in family composition occur either only one partner emigrates – which 
sometimes leads to a break-up – or when both partners emigrate and the 
children are left at home.  Research on East European immigrants in London 
and Brighton, UK, conducted in 2005, revealed that a little over one in five 
Bulgarians had left their partners in Bulgaria and most of their children lived 
there (Markova & Black 2007). Some male migrants involved in circular 
migration to Greece reported having families in both the home and host 
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country. Many have been reported as saying: ‘I have a home here and there; I 
have a wife in Bulgaria and two children; now, I have a partner and a child in 
Greece as well’ (Markova 2005). 
Children are most affected by the emigration of their parents. A study by 
Guentcheva et al. (2003) warns of the high dropout school rates amongst 
children of migrant parents who have been left behind in Bulgaria in the care of 
grandparents or aunts. According to teachers such pupils enjoy the freedoms 
associated with having more money than children whose parent did not 
migrate. They become easily spoiled and undisciplined and they do not obey 
their elderly grandparents or other relatives serving as their guardians. They 
start smoking, drinking and eventually leave school altogether. 
In the last few years, the Bulgarian press has often described these children as 
having ‘Skype parents’8. One study on access to education in Bulgaria found 
that the most frequently cited reason for dropping out of school was to join 
family members who have left for seasonal short-term or longer-term stay 
abroad (Iliev & Kabakchieva 2002). However, research also reveals some 
positive stories of families of returned seasonal migrants who have invested 
their savings into securing a better education for their children (Guentcheva et 
al. 2003). 
                                                 
8
 So-called after the Skype voice over internet programme that facilitates free video and telephone 
calls. 
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3.2. Labour market impacts of emigration 
Lucas (2005:89) maintains that ‘economic theory offers very few unambiguous 
hypothesised effects of emigration upon local labour markets’.  It’s plausible to 
assume though that emigration reduces labour supply overall and more 
specifically, the supply of the particular categories of emigrating workers, even 
in the long-run. Whether this will diminish unemployment pressures and 
pressures on the government budget (social support programmes) or increase 
wages in the labour market where the emigrants had departed from depends 
upon migrant employment status prior to departure  - whether employed or 
unemployed. Assuming the former, the effects on the origin labour markets will 
depend upon the prevalence of surplus of particular type, the institutional 
barriers to wage flexibility in that particular market, the role of international 
trade in the respective product markets, and the ability of those left behind to 
acquire skills or move to where the vacant positions are. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, most emigrants were Bulgarians of Turkish 
origin ‘pushed’ by economic decline in the ethnically mixed regions where they 
were residing. They were leaving because of lost livelihoods – tobacco growing 
and construction. The prices of tobacco were plummeting, the markets in the 
former socialist countries were lost, and the construction sector was collapsing, 
whilst residents in the border regions no longer enjoyed state privileges as part 
of the border control system during communism. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the majority of them went to work in low skilled jobs in Turkey. Overall, 
however, this emigration was characterised by ‘brain drain’ as well because 
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over half of the emigrants had educational levels higher than secondary school 
and some 12% were university graduates. Of the highly qualified workers, 10% 
came from engineering and technical professions, followed by economics and 
agricultural specialisations. These people were either unemployed or threatened 
to become unemployed due to the closure of many research institutes and the 
redundancy of managerial posts in the public sector (SOPEMI 1993). At the 
same time, the demise of the cooperatives and the privatisation or closure of 
many industrial plants produced a large number of unemployed workers across 
all skill categories. 
The massive emigration that started in 1989-1992 and continued though at a 
declining rate throughout the 1990s, took place from a domestic labour market 
characterised by dramatically increasing unemployment rates and rapidly 
deteriorating GDP growth rates. The market was distorted and could not 
operate properly as there were no institutions and mechanisms for social 
partnership on a national level to allow salary negotiations at branch and 
company level.  In the first half the 1990s, the whole public sector was hit by 
massive wage erosion; the real wage rate dropped by 52% (Beleva et al., 1996). 
In 1996, the Bulgarian labour market entered its most dramatic phase of 
development, with drastically devaluated national currency and the rate of 
inflation reaching its record of 435.8%.   
In this process of transition in the Bulgarian labour markets emigration has 
played a major role. In the absence of the emigration alternative, domestic 
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unemployment and the downward pressure on the wages of both the newly 
emerging private sector and the restructured public sector would have been 
much sharper.  
To sum up, the Bulgarian labour market of the 1990s was characterised as 
‘loose’ with huge labour surplus and large pool of unemployed workers across 
all skill categories. By definition, in such contexts, all departing workers and 
low skilled workers in particular can be easily replaced at little or no cost to 
employers usually through on-the-job-training. For the highly skilled though – 
engineers, scientists, teachers, accountants, doctors – in the short run, their 
departure only alleviated pressures on the labour market created by the surplus 
of this type of highly qualified labour and the inability of the market to absorb 
them.  However, in the long-run, the specific geographic locations of migrants’ 
origins have important implications for the local labour markets. For instance, 
labour markets in the peripheral regions of the country are likely to prove more 
inflexible in replacing the departing workers. The departure of migrants may 
result either in increase in wages or reduction in under-/unemployment in the 
areas from which migrants depart. However, given the segmented character of 
the Bulgarian labour market, these benefits are more likely to be 
disproportionately distributed across the country with the capital Sofia and 
other urban settings benefitting most and the peripheral regions being most 
disadvantaged. As a result, regional disparities have causes increased rural to 
urban migration. The rate of internal movement to urban areas (especially 
Sofia) has accelerated significantly. The increased concentration of high skilled 
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workers in the urban centres is likely to create new surplus putting downward 
pressures on wages. Similarly, the global economic and financial crisis will put 
additional pressure on the local labour markets – through contraction in the 
labour markets, slow down in wage growth and reduction in government 
spending on social protection programmes (World Bank 2009) – with 
peripheral markets likely to be the hardest hit. 
 
3.3. Brain drain, brain gain and the Diaspora 
Data from the National Statistical Institute suggested that, in the 1990s, a large 
proportion of emigrants from Bulgaria were highly skilled, alarming that 
Bulgaria might be loosing development potential. According to the director of 
the Sofia branch of Gallup international polling agency, ‘50-60% of the 
emigrants were highly-educated, including well-trained specialists’ (Tomiuc 
2002). Analysing ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain gain’ within Europe, Wolburg (2002) 
points out that some 20,000 scientists left Bulgaria in 1989 heading West, 
primarily to Germany, Ireland, the UK and France. In the period between 1990 
and 1992, another 40,000 specialists left the country (Straubhaar 2000). For the 
same period, Bulgarian sources reported an exodus of some 40,000 Bulgarian 
scientists (Sretenova 2003). Chobanova (2003: 24 cited in Gill & Guth 2005:6) 
states that in the case of Bulgaria: ‘The country has lost one small town of 
55,000 to 60,000 of its highest educated and skilled population each year 
during the last decade (1990s)’. Horvat (2004) argued that Bulgarian students 
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were among the largest South and Eastern European student populations in 
many European countries and scientists from Bulgaria usually had a very high 
skill ratio. An increasing number of Bulgarian citizens had applied for the 
Highly-Skilled Migration Programme (HSMP) in the UK during 2002-20059. 
The number of successful applicants ranged from six in 2002 when the scheme 
began to 40 in 2005. 
A significant number of the high skilled personnel leaving Bulgaria were 
school teachers. Due to dramatically declining birth rate and the emigration of 
young people and whole families, there were not enough children to enrol at 
school, which resulted in job losses for teachers. The number of children 
enrolled in primary, secondary, and high-school education in 1993-1994 has 
dropped by 39.0% (167,732 children); 37.3% (166,650); and 7.2% (26,346), 
respectively, in 2007-2008. The number of teachers in primary education has 
dropped from 24,601 in 1993-1994 to 16,585 in 2007-2008, a decrease of 
32.6%; the decrease of the number of secondary school teachers for the same 
period is 33.6% (12,160 teachers)10. The author’s research has shown that some 
6% of the sample of 100 undocumented Bulgarians in Athens in 1996 were last 
employed in Bulgaria as primary and secondary school teachers; the figure rose 
to 9% for the interviewed Bulgarians in Athens in 1999 in a sample of 153 
(Markova 2001). In a subsequent sample of 202 Bulgarian immigrants 
interviewed by this author in Madrid in 2003-2004, some 7% were teachers 
                                                 
9
 The HSMP started on 1 February 2002 and so data for 2002 are for 1 February to 31 December 2002.  
10
 Author’s calculations based on data made available by the National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria 
(http://www.nsi.bg/SocialActivities/Education.htm) (in Bulgarian).  
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(Markova 2006). In both countries, the former teachers, mainly women, were 
experiencing deskilling working in domestic services. 
Nonetheless, brain drain had particularly severe consequences for the 
development of the ethnically mixed regions in the country where the loss of 
key personnel (mainly doctors) rendered very difficult the delivery of health 
care. Guentcheva et al. (2003: 52) provide empirical evidence for this, showing 
that recent emigration from these areas involved the most active and qualified 
segment of the population i.e. those who had lost their privileged social status 
during the transition years of the 1990s. Among them were former mayors, 
representatives of municipal councils, former policemen, technicians, students 
and doctors.  In an earlier piece of research based on a set of Turkish statistics, 
Bobeva (1994: 227) showed that the community of Bulgarian Turks lost 9,000 
university graduates to emigration during the early 1990s. 
Other researchers, however, believe that ‘there has been just a trickle of highly 
qualified emigrants, and even cumulatively it is not big enough to make any 
difference at all’ (Gächter 2002). They argue that there has been no dearth of 
professionals and specialists in Bulgaria, at least compared to other Balkan 
countries. The number of scientists and researchers among Bulgaria’s working-
age population still remained high, especially in relation to GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity (PPP). And, the reduction in the number of scientists 
and professionals only served to bring the numbers of technicians to a more 
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realistic and sustainable level, namely in line with other, frequently much 
wealthier, countries in the area (ibid).  
In the last few years, some young Bulgarian financial brokers have set up 
organisations which aim to attract business interest to Bulgaria. The ‘City 
Club’ in London and the Wall Street in New York were the most successful 
among them. It was the former Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov, who in 2000 first 
attempted to attract the interest and expertise of young Bulgarian expatriates to 
Bulgaria, organising an event titled ‘Bulgarian Easter’. Shortly after this, a 
similar initiative followed in the summer of 2000, and was organised by the 
then President, Peter Stoyanov. Ironically, just a year later, some of those 
invited to the event, such as financial brokers from London, became the main 
reason why Kostov’s party suffered major losses in the elections of June 2001. 
These elections presented a very interesting situation when a last-minute 
formed party led by a former king won and promised to save the country in 800 
days. Amongst the party’s candidates were professional Bulgarian emigrants – 
one of the most prominent participants in the recent Bulgarian government 
initiatives for attracting high skilled migrants to Bulgaria -who put on hold 
their careers in the west to participate in Bulgarian politics.  
They formed the first government comprised mainly of returned professionals.  
Even without repatriation, migrant communities have the potential to contribute 
to home country development. Remitting to or investing in the home country is 
one primary route. In addition, however, transnational networks via flows of 
economic and social capital are recognised today as the most important 
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developmental resource associated with international migration (Newland, 
2003). 
There are still no accurate numbers on the size of the Bulgarian communities 
abroad. The recently published National Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria 
on Migration and Integration (2008-2015) contains some estimates both of the 
old political immigrants and the new immigrants who had left the country after 
1989: over 50,000 in Germany, about 25,000 in Austria, about 10,000 in the 
Czech Republic, about 50,000 in Italy, about 3,000 in the Slovak Republic, 
about 5,000 in Hungary, about 4,000 in Belgium, about 110,000 in Greece, 
over 60,000 in the UK, about 2,000 in Sweden, over 15,000 in France, around 
10,000 in Portugal, over 120,000 in Spain. Another 200,000 Bulgarians are in 
the US, about 45,000 in Canada, some 15-20,000 are thought to be in South 
Africa and another 15,000-20,000 in Australia (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy 2008: 5). About 700,000 are thought to be the Bulgarians of Turkish 
origin in Turkey. Table 3 provides information on the stock of registered 
Bulgarian citizens in selected European destinations for the period 2000-2004.  
In 2003, the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad conducted a unique survey on the 
problems faced by the Bulgarian migrant community abroad in their attempts to 
participate in Bulgaria’s economy.11 The survey found that a lack of sufficient 
and reliable information on privatisation deals, investment possibilities and 
other aspects of economic reform in Bulgaria, as well as corruption at all levels 
of governance and onerous bureaucratic procedures, were amongst the main 
                                                 
11
 http://www.aba.bg.  
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issues pointed out by Bulgarians abroad as issues that affect the willingness of 
the Bulgarian migrant community to invest in Bulgaria. Based on their 
responses, the survey identified four main groups of Bulgarian migrants, 
according to their economic relations with the country. 
The first group consisted of very rich expatriates (about 50-70 persons), who 
had made some large investments in the country. However, some of them have 
been accused of destabilising actions against the state. Others were sceptical 
about investing in Bulgaria, fearing the strong, ‘hidden’ influence of the former 
communist party. The second group represented the ‘middle class’ of Bulgarian 
emigration (about 20,000 people). It is mainly in the US, Canada, Germany, 
Austria and other Western European countries. They are considered as an 
already established Bulgarian ‘lobby’ and a good investment potential for the 
country. They are usually in professional occupations, with good managerial 
skills and in good social and institutional positions in the host countries. The 
third group comprised a wider range of Bulgarian emigrants, from those who 
migrate on a seasonal or temporary basis and who are usually undocumented 
migrants to legal migrants in the lower social strata of the host country. Some 
80% of these people were estimated to remit small amounts of money each 
month to their families and relatives in the country. Finally, the fourth group 
included ethnic Bulgarian resettlements, usually situated close to Bulgarian 
borders. They strive to establish economic ties with their motherland. 
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State measures also include the establishment of websites on the labour market 
conditions in Bulgaria and current vacancies. Bulgarian students abroad are of 
special interest. The government plans to include them in a special register that 
will be made available to interested employers (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy 2008). 
Table 3 Stock of Bulgarian citizens in selected European countries. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany 
• Council of Europe, 2004 
• Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees, Germany (in Haug 
2005) 
 
32,290 
 
34,359 
 
 
 
38,143 
42,420 
 
42,419 
44,300 
 
… 
Greece 
• 2001 Census 
• Baldwin-Edwards, 2004 
  
35,104 
   
 
46,114 
Denmark** 394 408 426 460 … 
Iceland** 44 58 62 72 68 
Spain** 3,031 … … 44,151 63,155 
91,509 
(2005 
Census) 
Italy** 5,637 6,758 … … … 
Latvia** 22 24 25 23 28 
Norway** 355 … 464 533 567 
Portugal** 343 376 431 … … 
Romania** 92 86 92 92 67 
Slovenia** 127 66 68 … … 
Hungary 
• Council of Europe, 2004 
• SOPEMI, 2005. 
 
1,499 
1,200 
 
1,200 
1,100 
 
1,146 
1,100 
 
1,085 
 
 
1,118 
Finland** 317 297 308 326  
Netherlands** 713 870 1,074 1,360 … 
Czech Republic 
• Council of Europe, 2004 
 
• SOPEMI, 2005 
 
5,454 
4,000 
 
4,131 
4,100 
 
3,558 
4,200 
 
3,783 
4,100 
 
3,904 
United Kingdom 
• 2001 Population Census (England 
& Wales) 
• OECD data base on expatriates 
  
5,154 
 
5,350 
   
Switzerland** 1,943 2,012 2,293 2,596 2,589 
Sweden** 1065 1002 805 796 … 
** Source: Council of Europe, 2004, p. 310. 
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3.4. Remittances 
Remittances are generally considered to be one of the positive outcomes of the 
migration process. Most remittances are sent to family members in the home 
community of the migrant. The income distribution across families will depend 
upon the type of families that receive the remittances – whether it is the poorer 
or wealthier families that receive them. Lukas (2005) argues that the increased 
incomes as a result of remittances can in turn increase incomes for families 
who receive no remittances at all; one mechanism of doing it is through the 
multiplier effects of expanded spending – as migrants’ families increase their 
consumption, the additional demand for good sand services creates jobs for 
other families that also spend and increase demand. There has been much 
discussion of using remittances beyond consumption and for investment; 
spending on education, housing and land are recognised forms of investment. 
Along Lucas’s (2005) lines of analysis, at macroeconomic level, the amount of 
remittances that generate national investment is dependent upon the returns that 
can be obtained from those whose incomes were increased as a result of the 
remittances. Remittances may increase upward pressures on prices through 
expansion in consumption much of which is satisfied by imports, thus leading 
to trade deficits and current account deficits. In addition, remittances can also 
bring an infusion of foreign exchange may allow a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate; for economies with high imports relative to foreign exchange 
reserves, or for heavily indebted economies, the addition to foreign exchange 
availability can prove valuable (Lukas et al. 2006).  
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This section of the paper will only provide empirical evidence on the 
determinants of migrant remittances and their use in the context of Bulgaria. 
Data released by the Bulgarian National Bank show that the amount of money 
sent by Bulgarians abroad to relatives in the country has increased consistently 
in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, from 1998 onwards (Table 4). 
For example, money transfers in 2004 comprised about 4.2% of Bulgarian GDP 
and amounted to a greater share of national income than the educational and 
healthcare budget of the country. In 2006, the World Bank registered an 
increase in the amount of remittances pointing to US$ 1,695 million, or about 
5.4% of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2008: 71). Given the existence of 
informal methods of remitting money (transfers in cash and in-kind from 
returning Bulgarians emigrants), this figure is likely to under-report the actual 
scale of such transfers. Mintchev and Boshnakov (2005) estimate that the 
official figures register just some 45-50% of actual migrant remittances.  
According to data released by the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad12 at least 
300,000 people send amounts ranging between US$ 100 to US$ 300 to their 
families on a regular monthly basis. Remittances are used primarily to cover 
basic needs and the purchase of durable goods.  Stanchev et al. (2005) argue 
that remittances have become very important for improving living standards 
and reviving local economies through increased consumption and investment. 
                                                 
12
 The Agency for the Bulgarians Abroad (ABA) is a state institution tasked with collecting data about 
expatriate Bulgarians.  It also co-ordinates and supports the activities of state institutions towards 
expatriate Bulgarian communities (http://www.aba.government.bg). It should be noted that ABA uses 
the term ‘expatriate Bulgarian’ and  does not use the concept ‘Bulgarian emigrant’.  
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These macroeconomic effects, they claim, can also have the effect of delaying 
government reforms for economic restructuring and policies to tackle 
underlying causes of emigration. The ability of the private households to satisfy 
their immediate needs independently from the government can create a 
disincentive from the authorities to work for a better business environment and 
to deal with the economic and structural problems that pushed the people to 
leave initially. 
A qualitative study on the effects of seasonal migration on Bulgaria by 
Guentcheva et al. (2003) confirms the use of remittances for consumption and 
the purchase of houses and flats. In an interview about the use of remittances, 
the secretary of the Momchilgrad municipality, in the Kurdzhali region, 
commented: 
In spite of the widespread belief that remittances in the Kurdzhali region are at least 
€100 million a year, they are considered ‘dead capital’, immobilised into purchases of 
apartments, houses or luxury cars. This money does not circulate, does not serve local 
businesses. Money from seasonal workers abroad is not significant, because such 
people work primarily in low-wage sectors, do not bring much money and whatever 
they bring is used for consumption (often conspicuous). Our municipality is the 
region with the most Mercedes cars per person in the whole country. (in Guentcheva 
et al. 2003: 49) 
Bulgarian migrants spend money on health during their short visits home, 
notably on dentistry as they cannot afford to visit a dentist in Italy or Greece, 
where they live. 
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The pattern of allocating migrants’ money to houses and apartments has 
boosted the real-estate market in the region, significantly pushing prices up. A 
quantitative study by Mintchev and Boshnakov (2005), which used data from a 
random sample of 1,000 households, found that migrant remittances were 
mainly used for consumption, purchasing a car and property; very few, though, 
expressed an interest in buying land. This was explained by reference to the 
underdeveloped land market. Interestingly, it was also found that every fifth 
household receiving transfers from abroad was involved in some kind of 
entrepreneurship – to establish a new business and/or to support an existing one 
- whilst this was true for only one in ten households not receiving remittances. 
Transport, services and trade were the main sectors of productive investment. 
These were usually small and medium-size businesses as well as leasehold (e.g. 
purchase of a car and its usage for a taxi).  
Research regarding seasonal and undocumented migrants suggests that they 
remit more and remit more often. A study by the author based on questionnaire 
interviews with 100 undocumented Bulgarian immigrants living in Athens, 
Greece, in 1996, revealed that undocumented Bulgarians remitted on monthly 
basis over half of their earnings and there was no differentiation by marital 
status, number of family members in Bulgaria, intentions to stay in Greece or 
any other attributes. The only exception was the gender variable, indicating that 
women were sending a larger share of their income to Bulgaria compared to 
men. This could be explained by the fact that most of the women in the sample 
–divorced or married– had their children or whole families in Bulgaria. The 
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analysis of another sample of 153 Bulgarian immigrants interviewed by the 
author in Athens and on the island of Crete in 1999, some 10 months after the 
implementation of the first legalisation programme of the Greek government, 
showed considerable alteration in immigrants’ remitting and saving behaviour. 
Almost half of the sample, having acquired legal status and access to the 
banking system in the host country, had started saving more money in Greece, 
thus reducing the amount sent home. In contrast, undocumented migrants being 
uncertain about their stay in Greece remitted more often and remitted almost 
their entire income. The variable on the number of family members in Bulgaria 
had a significant explanatory power (at 1% level of significance); an additional 
family member in Bulgaria increased the probability of remitting by 34% 
(Markova, 2001; Markova and Saris 2002). These findings were resonant of the 
ones reported by Markova and Reilly (2007). The authors, utilising data from a 
sample of 188 Bulgarian immigrants living in Madrid in 2003-2004, found that 
the volume of remittances was higher, on average and ceteris paribus, for both 
females and those married. The impact effect for the gender control suggested 
that, on average and keeping all other variables constant, a female remitted 
annually about €588 more to Bulgaria than a male migrant. A married 
individual remitted over €420 more in the reference year than those in all other 
marital status categories. If the number of family members in Bulgaria (Spain) 
rose by one, the volume of annual remittances would rise (fall) by €135 (€402). 
The legal status of the respondents had the strongest effect reported. Bulgarian 
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immigrants who were living and working legally in Spain remitted almost 
€1,220 less per year than those who were undocumented. 
Table 4 The size of remittances and their share of main macro-indicators. 
Year Remittances (€ mil.) Exports 
% 
Imports GDP FDI 
Healthcare 
budget 
Educational 
budget 
1998 170,2 3.18 3.20 1.48 35.61 … … 
1999 233,3 4.30 3.81 1.92 30.75 … … 
2000 305,9 4.01 3.66 2.24 27.82 … 50.0 
2001 472,5 5.83 5.01 3.11 52.94 77.3 77.5 
2002 531,7 6.22 5.45 3.22 55.90 72.3 76.8 
2003 613,0 6.48 5.50 3.48 49.64 89.2 87.9 
2004 812.3 7.15 6.08 4.18 35.66 103.2 101.5 
2005* 587,0 3.09 2.53 1.95 22.60 … … 
2006** 1,356*** … … 5.4% … … … 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank and National Statistical Institute (Kostadinova, 2005 at www.ime.bg). 
Notes: * Jan-Sep ** World Bank, 2008: 71. *** $1,695 mil. The figure is based on avg. exchange rate 
for 2006, $1≈€0.80 www.x-rates.com/d/EUR/ USD/hist2006.html ). 
 
Recent projections of the World Bank (2009) point to a decrease of migrant 
remittances by some 7% because of deteriorating economic conditions in the 
migrant host countries affected by the global crisis.   
In mid-1990s, the increased transactions by the Bulgarian migrant community 
in Greece and their rising demand for financial services (sending money home) 
motivated Greek banks to expand their services into Bulgaria. Legalised 
immigrants are the main users of the banking system for transferring their 
money home. Since 1998, when the Greek government implemented its first 
regularisation programme for granting legal status to undocumented foreigners 
there, the number of Bulgarian immigrants legally residing and working in 
Greece has substantially increased.  Statistics from the database on residence 
  33 
permits, cited in the 2004 Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO) report 
and compiled for the year 2003-2004 by the Mediterranean Migration 
Observatory (MMO), identify 66,787 Bulgarians in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards 
2004). This increase may explain the growing number of Greek bank branches 
in Bulgaria in recent years. For example, Alpha Bank has now opened branches 
in twenty cities in Bulgaria. The five Greek banks – National Banks of Greece 
(which owns 99.9% of the United Bulgarian Bank), EFG-Eurobank (affiliated 
with Postbank), Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank and Emporiki Bank – currently have 
a market share of 25-30 per cent in Bulgaria13. It’s plausible to assume that 
these bank branches are increasingly turning into important employers for local 
people, especially for those who had worked in Greece. 
In addition to the Greek banks in Bulgaria, there are 419 Greek businesses 
operating in the country; some 40% of them were registered after the year 2000 
following almost a decade of Bulgarian immigration to Greece14. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some of them, especially the small and medium-sized 
companies have been established through connections with Bulgarian 
immigrants in Greece, and they have been recruiting bilingual returnees from 
Greece. 
 
                                                 
13
 http://www.invgr.com/se_europe.htm  
14
 Data provided by the Economic and Trade Office of the Greek Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria during the 
author’s research visit there on 7 November 2006.  
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4. State management of emigration 
State policy towards emigration has changed significantly since the communist 
era. Prior to 1989, emigration policies were directed at eliminating or reducing 
international travel.  Bulgaria’s post-communist migration policy aimed to 
achieve an optimal balance between the freedom of movement of people and 
the control of undocumented migration, whilst at the same time respecting the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms as guaranteed by international and 
European standards/conventions (Mintchev 1999). Strategic policy goals 
included: improvement in the management of economic migration; increasing 
border security in view of taking on regional responsibilities for the protection 
of the external borders of the EU; protecting the rights and promoting the 
integration of legal immigrants in Bulgaria; international cooperation and 
compliance with international treaties on migration (Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy, 2004). In an attempt to stem undocumented migration, several 
bilateral agreements for employment of seasonal/temporary workers have been 
signed since 1991.  
At present, bilateral employment agreements exist with Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Czech Republic, the Flemish 
Union of Belgium and the region of Lombardy in Italy15. These agreements 
provide for the employment of a limited number of Bulgarian nationals, 
including students, for specified periods of time and in professions where there 
                                                 
15
 http://www.mlsp.government.bg/bg/integration/agreements/index.htm (in Bulgarian) [retrieved on 17 
August 2008].  
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are skill shortages in the host country.  Bilateral agreements on social security 
exist with Germany, Poland, Spain, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, FYROM, Ukraine, Croatia, Serbia, Turkey, Hungary, Austria, 
Cyprus, Romania, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Libya.16   
As a response to the dramatic depopulation of the ethnically mixed regions in 
Bulgaria, the government attempted to resettle ethnic Bulgarians from abroad. 
The ‘unwritten’ policy amounted to an attempt to achieve an ethnic balance in 
‘ethnically sensitive areas’. Thus, returning ethnic Bulgarians from Moldova 
and Ukraine were resettled in the Kurdzhali region. However, the programme 
was not particularly successful as most of the returning ethnic Bulgarians 
wanted to settle in the cities, where some of the young ethnic returnees were 
enrolled at universities through a special government programme (Guentcheva 
et al. 2003: 53). 
Recently, the Bulgarian government introduced its long-awaited national 
strategy on migration and integration for the period 2008-2015. Its main 
objective is to attract Bulgarians living abroad and foreign citizens of Bulgarian 
origin to settle more permanently in the country; it also plans to attract high-
skilled third-country nationals to cover labour shortages. However, the 
government tends to ignore the fact that low skilled shortages will be more 
acute/or as acute as high skilled labour shortages in the medium and long run, 
and will also need to be covered by migrant labour. The new state policy for 
attracting Bulgarian emigrants for permanent return will be implemented by 
                                                 
16
 Ibid. 
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several institutions that will be established and coordinated by the Council of 
Bulgarians Abroad of the Council of Ministers. In the autumn of 2008, 
information campaigns for Bulgarians working in Spain, Germany, Greece and 
the UK were organised -with Bulgarian employers present- to discuss 
employment opportunities at home with potential returnees. These four 
countries were selected because of the large Bulgarian communities there and 
because of the presence of labour attaches in the respective embassies who are 
able to inform Bulgarian emigrants about current working conditions and 
remuneration in Bulgaria.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Emigration from Bulgaria continues, albeit at a declining rate. In recent years, a 
clear pattern of circular and temporary migration can be identified, especially 
after April 2001 when Bulgarian citizens were allowed a 3-month visa-free stay 
in countries within the Schengen zone and more recently, after the country’s 
EU membership in January 2007. Preferred destinations are Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Turkey and the UK. The US remains an important 
destination for permanent settlement. Temporary migration has become more 
regionally and ethnically specific with migrants increasingly originating from 
poor, ethnically mixed rural areas. 
Large out-migrations have considerably distorted the demographic profile of 
the population between 1989 and 2001. Young people and whole families have 
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migrated abroad thus contributing to the continuously decreasing birth-rate and 
steadily placing Bulgaria amongst the five ‘oldest’ countries in Europe. 
Brain drain through emigration is not a clear-cut issue for Bulgaria. However, it 
has had most severe consequences for the development of ethnically mixed 
regions in the country, where emigration involved the most active and qualified 
segments of the population. 
An estimated four million Bulgarians live abroad. The newly adopted National 
Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria on Migration and Integration for 2008-
2015 targets these people for a more permanent return. The group of Bulgarians 
who do not plan to return but are willing to contribute to Bulgaria’s economic 
development should not be ignored by policy-makers. They need to be 
provided with accurate and reliable information by the relevant state 
institutions, such as information on privatisation deals, conditions for 
investment and other aspects of economic reform in the country. Trade 
Departments and labour attaches within Bulgarian diplomatic missions abroad 
can play an important role in the process. 
Bulgaria is already experiencing a turn from being a migrant origin and transit 
country into a migrant receiving country. There is the need not only for high 
skilled professionals, but also for unskilled labour. This particular development 
has been ignored in the National Strategy on Migration. It is crucial that 
policymakers reconsider this issue and incorporate it in their plans. If they fail 
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to do this, the country risks attracting unskilled undocumented migrant labour 
and expanding its already flourishing shadow economy. 
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